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USING OWNERSHIP AS AN INCENTIVE: DOES THE
“TOO MANY CHIEFS” RULE APPLY IN ENTREPRENEURIAL FIRMS?
ABSTRACT
          Agency theory is used to develop hypotheses regarding the effects of ownership
proliferation on firm performance.  We examine the effects of CEO ownership, executive team
ownership, and all employee ownership, in addition to the moderating effect of risk, on firm
survival and stock price.  Firms with low CEO ownership outperform those with high levels of
CEO ownership across all levels of risk, but the effect is most pronounced for low risk firms. 
Executive team ownership is negatively related to firm performance, while ownership for all
employees is positively associated with firm performance particularly for higher risk firms. 
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INTRODUCTION
Agency theory assumes that the organizational form with the lowest agency costs is one
where the leader [Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or President] owns 100 per cent of the
company; in this case, the top executive is also the principal (owner).  When the top executive is
not the sole owner, then that individual becomes an agent (employee) of the firm, at which point
agency problems begin to arise.  Agency problems are said to occur when agents pursue
individual goals, which are not necessarily consistent with those of the organization.  In addition,
agency problems arise because risk preferences of agents are different from those of the
principal, resulting in employee decision making that is often less than optimal.  This leads to two
guiding assumptions of agency theory: first, owners pursue organizational goals and are risk
neutral, and second, agents pursue personal goals and are risk averse. 
In order to mitigate these agency problems, owners often share ownership with top
managers (most often the CEO) as an incentive to achieve goal congruence between the
manager and the firm and to lessen the deleterious effects of risk aversion of the agent.  Many
researchers (e.g. Glassman & Rhoades, 1980; Jain & Kini, 1994; McEachern, 1975; Mikkelson,
Partch, & Shah, 1997) have applied agency theory to examine the effects of ownership on firm
performance, but much of the research has been limited in that it has considered ownership only
for the CEO and the executive team.     
Agency theorists have specifically recognized that stock can be granted to executives as
a form of monitoring (incentive alignment) that helps mitigate the agency problem (see Gomez-
Mejia, 1994, for a review).  However, a broader conceptualization of ownership is important
because it also allows for consideration of ownership throughout he organization.  Ownership is
often extended beyond the CEO to the top management team, and in many cases, to all
employees.  When this occurs, the phenomenon of interest is not how much ne person is
encouraged to act like an owner but how many people within the firm are behaving like owners.  
 Thus, not only can the extent of CEO or top management team ownership be studied, but
proliferation of ownership throughout the organization can also be investigated.  In this case, the
entire organization moves toward the “principal” point on the continuum; our belief is that the
extent to which all employees have incentives to behave like owners will have positive effects on
firm performance.
This paper extends agency theory research by considering the effects of three different
forms of ownership on firm performance.  Our research considers the proliferation of ownership
throughout the organization by testing the effects of CEO ownership, top executive team
ownership, and ownership for all employees on long-term firm performance (survival and stock
price over time).  In addition, the moderating effect of firm risk level is investigated.  In order to
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highlight the potential differences due to firm risk, we conduct our study in a sample of initial
public offering firms, which are generally characterized as having greater variance in ownership
levels, being riskier and more entrepreneurial than larger, more established firms (Jones &
Butler, 1992; Beatty & Zajac, 1994).
AGENCY THEORY AND OWNERSHIP
Agency theory has been used to understand ways in which a firm can minimize agency
costs when owners must delegate work to others (Fama, 1980).  The theory has been classically
applied to study the relationship between owners of an organization and the managers who run
those firms (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The person delegating the work is called the principal, and
the individual to whom tasks are assigned is referred to as the agent.  Since most agency theory
research has involved top management, much of the work has focused on the study of incentive
systems used to align the interests of executives (agents) with those of the owners
(shareholders).  Executives have been the focal point of study because their behavior is difficult
to monitor through more traditional mechanisms (i.e. direct supervision, close monitoring of
behaviors).  Agency theory assumes that the best way of aligning employees’ interests with those
of the principal is through formal monitoring, and only when the cost of monitoring is high should
a company consider alternatives to formal monitoring (Eisenhardt, 1985).  In the case of
executives, formal monitoring is assumed to be impossible, therefore the study of executive
compensation, as a form of monitoring, has been pursued by a number of researchers from a
variety of academic fields (e.g. organization behavior, accounting, finance, human resource
management) (for a review see Gomez-M jia, 1994).
One form of incentive alignment is firm ownership (through the granting of stock), which
serves to create a situation in which the goals of the agent are similar to those of the principal
(Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1994).  By aligning goals, stock plans help mitigate problems associated
with risk taking propensities of agents.  Agency theory assumes that principals are risk neutral
because their portfolios are not 100 percent tied to one firm; however, agents, who cannot
diversify their employment portfolios, are considered to be risk averse (Jensen & Meckling,
1976).  Being risk averse, agents will make decisions that minimize risk in order to assure
continued employment.  According to Jones and Butler (1992: 73), “risk aversion encourages
managers to select safe projects that provide normal rates of return.”  By providing executives
with some form of ownership in the firm, it is assumed that they might be more willing to take
risks that optimize long-term performance of the organization.  Assuring an adequate level of risk
taking is important in entrepreneurial firms where risk taking is necessary in order to exploit
opportunities.
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Agency theory has been applied to the study of top executives because their behavior is
not easily monitored, but the theory should be equally applicable to any situation where work is
delegated, and applicable to any jobs that are not easily monitored (Welbourne, Balkin & Gomez-
Mejia, 1995).  Such may be the case in initial public offering firms for a number of reasons. 
Firms going public are often growing rapidly, and the IPO marks a period of dramatic change to
which employees must respond and adapt accordingly.  In addition, managers in high growth
firms tend to be “working managers,” and the IPO process places enhanced constraints on their
time.  The need for employees to rapidly adapt and the decreased time available for managers to
monitor employees lead many start-up firms to seek alternative ways to monitor employee
performance.  Therefore, many companies at this stage utilize incentives to align employee
interests with those of the firm.  As noted by Becker and Olson (1989), stock option programs,
which provide a form of ownership in the firm, can increase alignment among all employees
within an organization.  These plans provide individual employees with incentives to work toward
the organization’s goals in the same way th t CEO stock plans are incentives for executives to
make decisions that will support the interests of the shareholders or owners.  These systems
attempt to create an environment where employees are part owners of the business. 
It has been suggested that in entrepreneurial firms (which are abundant in the IPO
sample), where rapid change is occurring and bureaucratic structures are often not in place,
basically all jobs are difficult to monitor (Jones & Butler, 1992).  Entrepreneurism has been
defined as the process by which firms notice opportunities and act on those opportunities
(Kirzner, 1973).  If an entrepreneurial firm (rather than an individual) is to remain successful, all
employees in the company need to pursue and act upon opportunity, and this requires all
personnel to be somewhat willing to take risks and exploit opportunities that enhance the
organization’s goals.  Therefore, entrepreneurial firms should be more successful if ownership is
widely dispersed throughout the organization.  The argument, then, is not only that the CEO
should have an enhanced stake in the firm, but that more employees should share in the
ownership of the company.  Thus, we suggest that as ownership is extended to others in the firm
(top management and all employees), firm performance will increase. 
Hypothesis 1: Proliferation of ownership throughout the workforce company will positively
affect firm performance in entrepreneurial organizations.
Agency theory suggests that proliferation of ownership increases goal alignment, and as
a result, agents will be more likely to take risks that will enhance firm performance (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976).  This argument has been advanced for entrepreneurial firms in which risk taking
is an even more highly desirable behavior (Jones & Butler, 1992).  In addition, within a sample of
entrepreneurial firms, it seems that the “gain” from increasing ownership should be more
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pronounced in higher risk firms because ownership proliferation serves to share firm risk with
employees.  In fact, research on strategic human resource management suggests that newer,
dynamic, growing firms are more successful when they use compensation packages that have
lower base pay and a higher incentive component (Jackson, Schuler & Rivero, 1989; Miles &
Snow, 1984).  Given that stock ownership is a form of incentive pay, we argue that higher risk
firms should gain more benefit from proliferation of ownership.
Hypothesis 2: Proliferation of ownership will have a greater effect on firm performance for
higher risk firms.
RESEARCH METHOD
The sample used for this study contains 107 non-financial companies that initiated their
IPOs in 1988.   A total of about 250 firms filed securities registrations with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to conduct an IPO in 1988, and the list was pared down to 170 by
deleting those that were listed as closed-end funds, real estate investment trusts, and other firms
not producing a good or service.  Upon receipt of the 170 prospectuses, those firms in the “not
producing a good or service” category were dropped.  Only those firms for which we could
acquire stock price data starting in 1989 (the first year used for dependent variable data) were
used in this study.1  As a result, the final sample used for this study, after deleting cases based
on missing data, consists of 107 companies. 
Data were gathered from the prospectus of each firm.  The prospectus is the document
provided to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prior to the public offering, and it is
also the document circulated by the underwriter to assess demand for the firm's stock.  The SEC
requires firms to follow strict guidelines in the format.  The document itself is usually written by
members of the management team, investment bankers, and lawyers for both parties; it is then 
scrutinized by other lawyers and accountants.   While the potential for positive bias exists in the
prospectus, the firm is liable for any information that might mislead investors (O'Flahe ty, 1984). 
The Securities Act of 1933 (with amendments) sets the requirements for the prospectus, thus
assuring consistency in the type of information that is included in the document.  The SEC also
requires that the prospectus be accurate to the best knowledge of management.  Given this
requirement and the fact that the SEC requires a tremendous amount of detail regarding
company operations, the prospectus is a useful data source  (Marino, Castaldi, & Dollinger,
1989). 
                                         
1This sample is a subset of the one used in Welbourne and Andrews (1996).  Their study utilized only initial stock price,
thus they were able to study the entire sample of 136 companies. 
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Data Collection and Coding
Data were coded using a two-step process with two coders who were unaware of the
survival status of the companies as they coded.   First, five-page summaries of each prospectus
were constructed.  Given that the prospectus is not a traditional data source,  this first step
allowed for careful reading of each document, cross checking at the second stage of coding, and
notation of any unusual firm characteristics.  The second step involved numerically coding each
five-page summary for specific information.  Researchers cross-coded a sample of companies
(two people independently coded the same prospectus), and then switched companies for the
second stage of coding.  Any questions about codes were resolved through group consensus,
which involved meetings with the coders and an additional researcher. 
Sample Characteristics
At the time of its IPO, the average firm in the sample employed 675 people and had net
profits of almost $4 million.  The typical firm was much smaller, however.  Half of the firms had
fewer than 130 employees and 36% of the firms reported net losses at the time of their IPOs. 
Most of the businesses were located throughout the United States (5 were located in foreign
companies), with the highest percentage (24.1%) located in the Pacific States and the second
and third highest concentrations being in the South Atlantic (17.6%) and Mid-Atlantic (16.7%),
respectively.  Firms in the sample operated in numerous businesses ranging from food service
retailing to biotechnology to steel minimills.  Based on the Small Business Administration
guidelines for industry classification, the sample had 1 firm in agriculture, 47 in manufacturing, 9
in transportation, 5 in wholesale trade, 8 in retail trade, and 37 in service.
Independent Variables
Three types of ownership were studied; they were CEO ownership after the IPO, total
executive team ownership after the IPO, and shared ownership with all employees.  CEO and
executive team ownership were measured as continuous variables.  CEO ownership was coded
as the percentage of the company owned by the CEO after the initial public offering.  The mean
was 15.89% (s.d. = 17.51%), and the median was 10%.  CEO ownership ranged from 0 to 89%. 
Executive team ownership was measured as the total percentage ownership of all individuals
listed in the prospectus as part of the top management team; this number includes CEO
ownership.2  Given that ownership proliferation is the focus of the study, this variable captures
the extent of total management team ownership.  The mean for executive team ownership was
38.39% (s.d. = 21.85%), and the median was 38%.  Total top management team ownership also
ranged from 0 and 89%. 
                                         
2The analyses were run with executive team ownership calculated without CEO ownership included in the total, and the
results did not change.
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Since the percent of ownership of all employees was not available, this variable could not
be measured as a continuous variable.  However, the prospectus did list whether the company
had an incentive stock option plan for all employees (vs. only for the top management team
and/or key employees).  Incentive stock option plans were coded (vs. other forms of stock
ownership such as stock purchase plans) because agency theory focuses on using ownership as
an incentive.  Thus, all employee ownership was measured as a dichotomous variable with
companies that have incentive stock option (ISO) plans for ll employees (including the CEO and
management team) being coded as a one (1), and those without ISOs coded as a zero (0). 
Forty-eight percent of the firms in the sample had ISO plans for all employees.  Table 1 includes
the means and standard deviations for all variables used in the analyses. 
TABLE 1:  MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS
Variable Name Mean Standard Deviation
Industry (0=manufacturing, 1= service) 0.54 0.50
Number of employees 675.25 1,664.09
Net profit 3,952,679.24 12,094,101.30
Risk 4.27 1.92
CEO ownership after to the IPO 15.89% 17.51%
Executive team ownership after IPO 38.39% 21.85%
All employee stock (0=No ISOs for
     all employees, 1=ISOs for all) .48 .50
Survive as of 1993 (0=Non-survivor
  1=Survivor) .68 .47
Initial stock price 7.01 5.21
Stock price, year end 1989 7.77 6.61
Stock price, year end 1990 6.22 6.47
Stock price, year end 1991 10.46 12.35
Stock price, year end 1992 11.43 12.21
Stock price, year end 1993 12.85 11.81
Change in stock price
   (IPO to year end 1993) 131.81% 302.82%
Dependent Variables
Three dependent variables were investigated: survival status as of 1993, year end stock
price for five years following the IPO (1989-1993), and change in stock price from the time of the
IPO through year end 1993.  Survival status is not easily determined, ther fore, several steps
were taken to assure correct identification of survivors.  First, an on-line data base of current
public firms was searched to find current information on the companies.  Supplemental
information were gathered from Disclosure, a data clearing-house for the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).  Disclosure was able to identify many of the active and inactive
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companies.  Additionally, we searched the Dir ctory of Obsolete Securities (1994) and several
on-line services including EDGAR, the Dow Jones News Retrieval Service, and Bloomberg
Financial in order to identify bankruptcy, name changes, recapitalizations, delistings, and
mergers.  Firms that had entered Chapter 7 (liquidation) of the 1978 Bankruptcy Reform Act were
coded as non-survivors.  A number of firms had changed their names between the times of their
IPOs and year end 1993.  We called these firms to find out whether their name changes were
merely cosmetic, or whether the businesses had undergone other major transformations. We
coded mergers as survivors or non-survivors based on their stock performance prior to the time
of the merger and terms of the merger.  Finally, firms whose stock was delisted3 from the
exchanges on which it had been trading were treated as non-survivors using the logic that being
delisted would hinder the a firm’s access to capital and constitute “failure” as a public company. 
The overall survival rate for the sample was 68%.
Each company’s year end stock prices from 1989 through 1993 were obtained from
COMPUSTAT.  Economic performance as defined by capital market measures is the most
appropriate measure of performance for IPO firms.  Not only are stock market measures the
most prevalent in the IPO literature (see Ibbotson & Ritter, 1995 for a review), but accounting
measures of performance (e.g. earnings per share, ROA, ROE) are susceptible to varying
accounting methods and to manipulation (e.g. Lev and Thiagarajan, 1993).  Thus, we used year-
end stock prices as well as a measure of stock price growth from the time of the IPO through
1993 as measures of firm performance. 
Control Variables
Based on reviews of the initial public offering, survival, and strategic human resource
management literatures (e.g. Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Huselid, 1995; Welbourne & Andrews, 1996),
several control variables were used in the analyses.  The total number of employees, logged to
correct for skewness, was included as a measure of size.  Net profit at the time of the IPO (also
logged) was added as a performance measure.  A dichotomous measure coded "1" for service
industry and “0" for manufacturing was used to control for industry.  The two category industry
classification was selected after reviewing the distribution of firms in the Small Business
Administration’s recommended categorization.  The majority of the firms fell into either the
manufacturing or service categories; therefore, in order to preserve statistical power, we used
the two industry classification (created by consolidating non-manufacturing sectors into the
                                         
3 Delistings generally occurred because firms either failed to meet certain financial requirements of the exchange (i.e.
asset size) or to file required documents with the SEC.
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service category) in the analyses.4  Because offering price per share is a significant predictor of
future share prices, we also included initial price per share as a control variable in analyses of
future share prices.
 Not only is firm risk central to testing hypothesis 2, but we believe that l l of firm risk
might affect our analyses of direct effects.  Therefore, we control for firm risk in all analyses.
Each prospectus contains a section listing all risk factors faced by the company.  The data must
be disclosed to meet the requirements of the Securities and Exchange Commission.  Prior
research on initial public offering firms found that this was a useful way to code risk (Beatty &
Zajac, 1994; Rasheed & Datta, 1994).  The presence of the following risk factors were included
in this measure: technological obsolescence, new product, few or limited products, limited
number of years in operation, inexperienced management, seasonality, customer dependence,
supplier dependence, inexperienced underwriters, competition, legal proceedings against
company, liability, and government regulation.  The summated risk measure ranged from 1 to 11,
with a mean of 4.27 and a standard deviation of 1.92.
Data Analyses
First, we ran bivariate correlations to assess relationships between variables used in the
subsequent tests of the hypotheses.  To evaluate the effects of ownership proliferation on
survival, we used logistic regression as prescribed by Allison (1984) for dichotomous dependent
variables.  Finally, ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions sufficed for predicting year end stock
prices and stock price growth.
RESULTS
Table 2 includes the correlation matrix for all variables included in the analyses.  Survival
is significantly and positively related to firm size, profits and initial price per share.  Firms with
more employees and higher profits at the time of the IPO, not only offer their stock at higher
prices but are more likely to survive than smaller, less profitable companies.  Survival is not
significantly related to any of the ownership variables.  Stock prices for years ending 1989
through 1993 are also significantly associated with firm size, profit, and offering price, and with
firm risk.  Larger, more profitable firms tend to be less risky and able to offer their shares at
higher prices, and in turn, enjoy higher subsequent stock prices.  The ownership variables are
significantly related to future stock prices only in a couple of years (i.e. 1991 & 1993), but the
pattern consistently suggests that CEO and executive team ownership are negatively related to
stock price while stock ownership for all employees is positively associated with year end stock
prices.
                                         
4 Analyses run with the complete set of industry variables yielded similar results.
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TABLE 2
CORRELATION MATRIX FOR VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSES
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11        12           13 14 15
1. Industry    1.00
2. Log # of employees  .04 1.0
3. Log of risk .00 -.39***1.0
4. Log of net profit    -.13 .46*** -.43***1.00
5. Price per share -.07 .60*** -.39*** .62***1.00
 
6. CEO ownership .07 .21* .12 -.09 -.26** 1.00
7. Executive team ownership .07 -.05 -.04 -.10 -.08 .48***1.00
8. Stock for all employees .05 -.15 .25** -.20* -.20* .12 .08 1.00
9. Survival status, 1993 -.15 .31*** -.14 .24* .38*** -.08 -.07 .06 1.00
10.Log stock price 1989 .06 .34*** -.26** .32*** .57*** -.13 -.04 .04 .39***1.00
11.Log stock price 1990 .02 .43*** -.28** .42*** .66*** -.10 -.20 .01 .45*** .76***1.00
12.Log stock price 1991 .02 .40*** -.14 .31** .56*** -.21* -.23* .14 .52*** .65*** .87***1.00
13.Log stock price 1992 .03 .43*** -.22 .20 .38*** -.16 -.22 .16 .47*** .43*** .68*** .88***1.00
14.Log stock price 1993              -.08 .40***  -.28** .15 .37***  -.25*      -.20 .07 .31*** .35** .59*** .71*** .89*** 1.00
15.Change in stock price              -.12        -.18 .00        -.17      -.36***  -.03        -.10       .19.16 -.13        -.01 .12 .29** .40***  1.00
*     p < .05
**   p < .01
*** p < .001
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Survival
Table 3 shows the results of tests of both hypotheses 1 and 2 for firm survival as of 1993.
 Hypothesis 1 stated that ownership proliferation would positively affect firm performance, and it
is tested using a logistic regression model including only direct effects.  Hypothesis 2 stated that
ownership proliferation would have a greater impact on firm performance for higher risk firms and
is tested by including interaction terms for each of the ownership variables with risk.  Although
the full model of direct effects significantly predicts firm survival (Chi2 = 16.06, p<0.05), none of
the ownership variables is significant; all else equal, ownership does not appear to affect firm
survival, providing no support for hypothesis 1.  However, the full model including interaction
terms suggests that the effect of ownership may vary with firm risk; not only does the addition of
interaction terms contribute significantly to Chi2, but the interaction term for risk and level of CEO
ownership is a significant predictor of survival.
To better understand the implications of the significant interaction effect, we plotted mean
survival rates at three levels of risk for firms with high CEO ownership (above the median) and
firms with low CEO ownership (below the median).  Figure 1 shows the results.  At low and
medium levels of risk, firms with low CEO ownership “out-survive” firms with high CEO
ownership.  Organizations that face high levels of risk at the times of their IPOs, however, appear
to be unaffected by level of CEO ownership.  Thus, although firm risk level does play a part in
predicting performance, hypothesis 2 is not supported.  In fact, ownership appears to have a
greater effect on firms at low and medium levels of firm risk, and less CEO ownership is
preferable to more.
TABLE 3
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS FOR SURVIVAL AS OF 1993
Full Model of Full Model w/
Controls Only Direct Effects Interactions
Variables b s.e b s.e. b s.e.
Intercept -13.76 12.39 -19.65 14.85 -12.81 16.41
Industry -.74 .46 -.68 .49 -1.06 .57
Risk .54 1.77 .86 1.91 1.01 2.10
Number of employees .30* .15 .30+ .15 .39* .18
Net profit .83 .76 1.18 .92 .74 1.00
CEO Ownership .00 .02 -.01 .02
Executive Team Ownership -.01 .01 -.01 .02
Stock for All Employees .49 .48 .54 .53
Risk interaction 1 (CEO * Risk) .47* .21
Risk interaction 2 (Executive * Risk) -.13 .12
Risk interaction 3 (Stock for All * Risk) -3.19 3.88
Chi2 16.05** 16.06* 25.59**
*** p < .001 **   p < .01 *     p < .05 +     p < .10
Unstandardized logistic regression coefficients reported
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FIGURE 1
INTERACTION EFFECT FOR CEO OWNERSHIP AND RISK
ON SURVIVAL AS OF 1993
0.63
0.86
1.00
0.64
0.80
0.36
0.00
0.10
0.20
0.30
0.40
0.50
0.60
0.70
0.80
0.90
1.00
Low Risk Medium Risk High Risk
M
e
a
n
 
S
u
r
v
i
v
a
l
Low CEO Ownership High CEO Ownership
Using Ownership as Incentive WP 96-14
Page 14
Stock Price
Table 4 includes the results of the regression analyses for direct effects of ownership
proliferation on stock prices for years ending 1989 through 1993 and for stock price growth from
the time of the IPO through 1993.5  Each of the equations for year end stock price is significant
with R2 ranging from .31 in 1993 to .51 in 1990; the overall equation for stock price growth is not
significant.  The effect of executive team ownership is negative in all equations and is significant
in years ending 1990 through 1992.  Providing support for hypothesis 1, stock ownership for all
employees is positive and significant for each of the five years analyzed.
TABLE 4
REGRESSION ANALYSES FOR DIRECT EFFECTS ON YEAR-END STOCK PRICES
Stock
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Growth
Variables Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Industry    .11 .10 .09 .04 -.08 -.05
Risk   -.08  -.11 .04 -.11 -.20 -.10
Number of Employees -.03 .06 .12 .31* .26+ .06
Net Profit -.04 -.10 -.07 -.11 -.21 -.05
Initial Offering Price .63*** .69*** .58*** .27+ .27+ -.30
CEO Ownership .02  .23* .05 .07 -.04 -.03
Executive Team Ownership  -.01 -.26** -.21* -.22+ -.16 -.03
Stock for All Employees .17+ .17* .24* .26* .20+ .10
R2 .37 .51 .41 .32 .31 .10
F 6.25*** 10.34*** 6.33*** 3.68*** 3.18** .75
*** p < .001 **   p < .01 *     p < .05 +     p < .10
Standardized regression coefficients are reported.
Table 5 includes results of regression analyses including direct effects and interaction
effects of each type of ownership with firm risk.  Again, each of the equations for year end stock
price is significant, but the equation for stock price growth is not significant.  However, only the
equations for years ending 1989 through 1991 show a significant change in R2 from the equations
including only direct effects (i.e. Table 4).6  The interaction terms for CEO ownership and stock
ownership for all employees emerge as significant predictors of year end stock prices in several
                                         
5 We ran hierarchical regressions entering the ownership variables on the second step, but for clarity, Table 4 includes
only the final results.  Addition of the ownership variables contributed significantly to the overall variance explained only in 1990,
1991, and 1992.
6 We ran hierarchical regressions, entering entered the interaction terms in the last step, but for clarity, Table 5 includes
only the final results.
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years.  Interestingly, the negative effect for executive team ownership does not seem to vary with
level of firm risk.
TABLE 5
REGRESSION ANALYSES WITH RISK INTERACTION EFFECTS ON YEAR-END STOCK PRICES
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Growth
Variables Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta Beta
Industry .10 .09 .10 .06 -.08 -.10
Risk -.06 .09 .08 -.08 -.19 -.10
Number of Employees -.06 .03 .09 .28* .25+ .05
Net Profit -.13 -.19+ -.16 -.16 -.24 -.18
Initial Offering Price .62*** .68*** .55*** .24 .27 -.26
CEO Ownership -.13  .06 -.10 -.05 -.11 -.19
Executive Team Ownership  .03 -.21* -.17+ -.19 -.14 .01
Stock for All Employees .14 .14+ .20* .23* .19 .08
CEO Ownership*Risk .29** .35*** .26* .21 .14 .35**
Exec. Team Ownership*Risk -.05 -.12 .02 -.07 -.03 -.05
Stock for All*Risk .15+ .11 .25** .21+ .06 -.09
R2 .43 .57 .51 .38 .32 .18
F 5.72*** 9.53*** 6.52*** 3.24** 2.31* 1.11
*** p < .001;    ** p < .01;    * p < .05;    + p < .10
Standardized regression coefficients are reported.
Figures 2 and 3 include plots depicting the effects of the significant risk interactions for
CEO ownership and stock for all employees on 1991 stock price, respectively.7  F gure 2
suggests that firms with low levels of CEO ownership enjoy higher stock prices than firms with
high levels of CEO ownership at both low and high levels of firm risk.  The difference is most
striking at low levels of firm risk.  At high levels of firm risk, differing levels of CEO ownership do
not appear to result in substantially different year end stock prices.
Figure 3 shows the 1991 stock price for firms with and without ISO plans for all
employees at low and high levels of firm risk.  The graph indicates that stock ownership for all
employees results in higher stock prices, particularly for high risk firms.  Not having ISOs for all
employees results in lower stock prices with increasing levels of risk, whereas having ISOs
results in higher stock prices with increasing levels of risk.  Overall, these results for the effects
of the interaction terms provide mixed support for hypothesis 2.  Higher levels of CEO ownership
hindered performance while employee ownership appeared to help firm performance, particularly
at higher risk levels.
                                         
7 The pattern of results are similar for each year in which the interaction effects are significant.  For simplicity, we include
only the plots for the effects on 1991 stock price.
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FIGURE 2
INTERACTION EFFECT OF CEO OWNERSHIP AND RISK
ON 1991 STOCK PRICE
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FIGURE 3
INTERACTION EFFECT OF STOCK OWNERSHIP FOR ALL EMPLOYEES AND RISK
ON 1991 STOCK PRICE
4.92
11.12
10.71
14.94
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
16.00
Low Risk High Risk
S
t
o
c
k
 
P
r
i
c
e
No ISOs for All Employees ISOs for All Employees
Using Ownership as Incentive WP 96-14
Page 18
DISCUSSION
The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of various types of ownership on
firm performance and to assess whether or not firm risk level moderated those effects.  Drawing
from agency theory, we hypothesized that ownership proliferation would positively affect firm
performance and that the positive effect would be stronger for higher risk firms.  When stock is
granted to all employees, ownership proliferation is at its highest, and our analyses for  “all
employee ownership” do support our hypotheses when stock price is the dependent variable. 
Firms that had incentive stock options for all employees had higher stock prices after the IPO
(test of the direct effect show a positive effect for all years studied, 1989 to 1993), and we found
that the effect was greatest for firms with higher levels of risk (interaction effects were significant
for years 1989, 1991, and 1992).  Thus, when stock price was used as the dependent variable,
most of our data support the hypotheses. 
The results for CEO ownership, although not specifically addressed in our hypotheses,
are worth some discussion.  We found no direct effects for level of CEO ownership on either
survival or stock price, but the interaction effects were significant for both dependent variables. In
general, CEO ownership appears to have a negative effect on firm performance.  It is interesting
to note that, for the survival analysis, lower levels of CEO ownership are preferable to higher
levels, but the trend shows that at the very highest levels of risk, amount of CEO ownership does
not really matter.
In fact, when we examined correlation data for the highest risk firms (more than 6 risk
factors - 15 companies), we found that CEO ownership was positively correlated with stock price
growth (0.72, significant at p<0.01).  This is compared to a negative and insignificant correlation
for stock price growth and CEO ownership (r= -0.52, p<0.20) for the lowest risk firms (i.e. fewer
than 3 risk factors, 14 companies).  In lowest risk firms, the correlation between CEO ownership
and survival is significant and negative (r= -0.65, p<0.05).  Thus, the correlation data support our
findings that the relationship between CEO ownership and performance is different at low and
high levels of risk.  In fact, the correlation data show a positive relationship at high levels and a
negative relationship at low levels of firm risk.  Further research, perhaps using alternative
measures of risk and/or different samples is needed to explore the effect of CEO ownership on
firm performance in those firms which varying degrees of risk. 
The effects for proliferation of ownership to the executive team level were somewhat
similar to what we found with CEO ownership.  However, there were only significant and negative
effects on stock price for years starting from 1990 and going through 1993.  None of the
interaction effects were significant for executive team ownership.  
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Thus, our overall results show that ownership proliferation can have a positive impact on
firm performance when ownership is spread to all employees.  And, high levels of ownership in
the hands of the CEO or the executive team can negatively impact firm performance.  These
results have implications for both practice and theory, and each will be discussed in the next
sections. 
Implications for Practice   
The finding that concentration of ownership in the hands of the top management team
has deleterious effects on future stock price performance while opening ownership up to all
employees has positive effects is an important finding for smaller, growing firms such as those in
our IPO sample.  The findings highlight the benefits of encouraging all employees in the firm to
behave like owners.  It supports our belief that in entrepreneurial firms, where change is
occurring rapidly, top managers must rely on alternative forms of monitoring employees that will
prompt employees to actively pursue and exploit opportunities. 
Concentration of ownership within the top management team may not only be inadequate
in this regard, but may, in fact, discourage lower level employees from engaging in the types of
behaviors that are necessary to make these early stage companies successful.  It could be that
high levels of CEO and executive team ownership occur in companies with a more hierarchical
structure and more control oriented culture.  As a result, employees may be given little discretion
and/or freedom to act in ways that maximize firm performance.  Employees may also be
discouraged from sharing information, and as suggested by agency theory, when information is
not shared, firm performance decreases. 
We further hypothesized that firm risk level would affect the relationship between type of
ownership and performance.  Our examination of the moderating effect of risk on stock price
indicated that higher risk firms performed better when ownership was dispersed to all employees.
 But, we did not find similar results for survival.  It may be that survival is an outcome that is
beyond the ability of the employees to impact (due to the extreme nature of the problems that
may be leading to organizational death), or perhaps changes in the firm between the time of the
IPO and 1991 (data that we do not have) explain the finding.  It is interesting to note that the
pattern of results for CEO ownership and risk are similar for both survival and stock price growth,
but the pattern is different for ownership by all employees.
Overall, this study indicates that using ownership as an incentive can be both a detriment
and an effective tool in enhancing firm performance; high levels of executive team ownership
have harmful effects on performance while making ownership available to all employees via ISOs
enhances stock price growth.  It appears that only one or a small group of “chiefs” can be
detrimental if all employees are not also made to feel like “chiefs” as well.  While much of the
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past agency theory literature has focused on ownership by the CEO, our study suggests that
CEO ownership only paints part of the picture of the relationship between ownership and
performance.  Firm owners should consider expanding the concept of ownership to all
employees, and they must also consider firm risk level, because risk does play a role in
moderating the relationship between ownership and performance.
Implications for Agency Theory
Our results offer support for two different views of agency theory.  The first, that highlights
the potential disadvantages of excessive risk bearing on the part of the agent (Shavell, 1979), is
supported with our results for CEO ownership.  CEOs (as agents) in these firms face significant
pressures to “deliver” in terms of firm performance and high degrees of uncertainty stemming
from potential threats to their own employment.  Although some agency theorists (e.g. Jensen
and Meckling, 1976) would advocate increasing CEO ownership in such cases to more closely
align the objectives of the CEO with those of the owners, an alternative view (e.g. Shavell, 1979;
Eisenhardt, 1985) exists that proposes the CEO’s inability to diversify his/her personal risk
portfolio (i.e. employment and income opportunities) may enhance risk aversion and lead to
making decisions that reduce personal level of risk but that are not in the best interests of the
firm.  This will, in turn, lead to increased agency costs for the firm and decreased organizational
performance.  This explanation appears to apply in this sample in reference to CEO ownership;
firms with the lowest levels of CEO ownership and risk appear to perform the best in terms of
stock price and survival.
 The second interpretation of agency theory is supported with our results for all employee
ownership.  The findings for the interaction effect of risk and ISOs for all employees can best be
explained by the view of agency theory that advocates increasing incentives for agents to behave
as owners.  While there were no significant effects on survival, firm risk did moderate the
relationship between ownership for all employees and ye r end stock prices in the first five years
after the IPO.  Sharing risk and potential rewards with all employees via ISO plans had positive
effects on stock prices particularly at higher levels of firm risk.  This supports the agency theory
prediction (e.g. Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Becker & Olson, 1989) and the view from strategic
human resource management (e.g. Miles & Snow, 1984) that utilizing incentives serves to align
interests of employees with those of the firm. 
Thus, our results indicate that both interpretations of agency theory are accurate;
however, they are supported for different ‘agents.’  Our results may be unique to the initial public
offering sample of firms, or they may be the result of our simultaneously studying multiple groups
of agents (CEO, executive team, and all employees).  Conventional wisdom would suggest that
CEOs should be less susceptible to the ill effects of excessive risk bearing than would rank and
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file workers.  Presumably CEOs would have more opportunity for mobility within the labor market
(i.e. higher and more flexible skills) and should be less prone to suffer from having all of their
human capital tied to one firm.  But with the IPO firms, where many CEOs are the founder, that
may not be the case.  In addition, in IPO firms, lower level employees might seek out
opportunities with the potential for big payoffs (i.e. they may be willing to endure the
compensation risk associated with foregoing cash compensation in return for ISOs and the
possibility of large payoffs).  Assumptions regarding the risk profile of the CEO and of the ‘all
employee’ group need to be questioned and further studied.  Our study points out the importance
of extending agency theory research to new samples (such as the IPO sample) and to additional
groups of employees (all employees in addition to CEOs). 
Assumptions about risk are central to agency theory arguments, yet they have received
relatively little attention in the past.  Our research and other recent studies  (e.g. Beatty & Zajac,
1994; Bloom & Milkovich, 1995), highlight the need to focus on the concept of risk when
conducting agency theory research.  Future research should continue to examine risk among a
more diverse population of employees (management and non-management workers), and in
addition, it may be helpful to consider the effects of various sources of firm risk.  At least for the
IPO firm sample, some forms of risk are more controllable th n others.  For example, the risk of
inexperienced management is different than the risk of technological obsolescence; the former is
an internal risk that may be more easily addressed than the latter, which is a risk that is external
to the firm.  It is quite possible that employees will respond differently if the source of risk is
perceived to be under the control of the firm.  However, to date, sources of risk have been
virtually unexplored.  
Limitations
There are several limitations to this study that should be considered when interpreting the
findings.  These limitations relate to measurement of variables and to the sample itself.  CEO
ownership and executive team ownership were measured as a percent of the total stock
available; however, the measure of all employee ownership was not continuous.  Instead, it was
a dichotomous variable that only indicated whether or not the firm had an incentive stock option
plan for all employees.  We did not know what percentage of the company’s stock was included
in the plan or what percentage was owned, on average, by employees.  A clearer understanding
of the full effect of employee ownership might allow us to make more definitive conclusions about
the effects of all employee ownership. 
As we have already suggested, this study might be limited by the relatively coarse risk
measure.  Although our additive measure of risk factors listed in the prospectus is consistent with
prior research (e.g. Beatty & Zajac, 1994), future research should investigate the relative
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importance of various types of risk.  In addition, firm survival is a difficult variable to measure,
and although several steps were taken to assure that it adequately captured long term firm
viability, there is still potential for error.
The analyses may also be vulnerable to specification error; any inferences made from the
current study are limited to variables measured at the time of the IPO.  Although this study gives
an indication of the effects of ownership at the time of the IPO on long term performance, future
research should include measures of changes in ownership over time and should control for
other factors such as changes in profitability and firm size.
Finally, while this study of IPO firms provides benefits in highlighting the risk elements of
agency theory, the generalizability of our analyses and conclusions may be limited by the sample
chosen for study.  First, this particular group of IPOs may not be representative of all firms at this
stage.  As a result of the 1987 market crash, fewer companies went public in 1988 than in
previous years, and those that did were less risky.  Second, the sample is relatively small from
the beginning and the sample size was reduced with each successive year because non-
survivors dropped from the sample.  The reduced sample size may have especially affected the
analyses for the effects of ownership on stock price growth and may partially explain the
insignificant findings for that variable. 
Conclusion
Despite its limitations, this research does contribute to the agency theory and small
business management literatures by expanding the concept of ownership to others within the
firm.  It suggests that entrepreneurs may want to be more attentive to the potential benefits and
pitfalls of sharing risk via ownership with employees.  It may not necessarily be best to retain
ownership within the confines of the top management team, and offering ownership to all
employees via incentive stock option plans must also be considered in light of the overall level of
firm risk.  It seems that firm risk level creates a complex scenario that has not been adequately
addressed.  Given recent trends toward using more risk sharing (move to use of gain haring,
profit sharing, and stock programs), this topic is of importance for both academics and
practitioners.  Further research and additional theoretical refinement of the impact of risk sharing
to not only executives, but to the diverse employee population, are needed.
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